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Gendering the President Male: Executive Authority 
Beyond Rule-of-Law Constitutionalism in the American 
Context  
Larry Catá Backer1 
Abstract: Law, like other methods of disciplining behavior, has a gen-
der dimension.  Consciously or not, male elites in the United States, like 
those in other nations, continue to protect the male gender borderlands of 
behavior norms in ways that affirm for those behaviors a privileged role of 
the standard by which male and female conduct is judged.  And there is no 
more powerful set of behavior norms than law, and especially constitutional 
law, in the United States.  This essay considers the gender hierarchy and 
behavior presumptions just under the surface of Harvey Mansfield’s recent 
suggestion that rule of law constitutionalism ought to be limited to the leg-
islative an judicial branches, which are meant to be cooperative and nurtur-
ing institutions, but that the President’s Constitutional powers extend be-
yond the mere execution of the laws, and can include extra-legal acts.  
“Thus it is wrong to accuse President Bush of acting illegally in the surveil-
lance of possible enemies, as if that were a crime and legality is all that 
matters.”  After a short introduction, Part II starts with a discussion of the 
relation between gender hierarchy and law.  It sets out the parameters 
within which gender analysis of institutional action and facially genderless 
arguments can be understood as embracing gender assumptions of three 
kinds—first a gender hierarchy in which the male is privileged over the 
female, second a set of assumptions about those behaviors that are inher-
ently female and those inherently male, and third, a behavior legitimating 
reflex avoiding the legitimacy of males or male institutions assuming fe-
male behavior roles.  This analysis provides the context for Part III, which 
analyses Harvey Mansfield’s argument that the assertion of a power in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
1
 Visiting Professor of Law, Tulane Law School, New Orleans, LA; Director, Coalition for Peace 
and Ethics, Washington, D.C.; Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA.  An 
earlier version of this essay was presented as part of a panel entitled “Masculinity, Maleness and the 
Constitution,” at the 12th Annual LatCrit Conference, October 6, 2007.  My thanks to Professor John 
Kang for organizing the panel, to the participants at the presentation, whose questions and comments 
were extremely insightful, and to my research assistant, Augusto Molna (Penn State ’09) for his excel-
lent work on this project.   
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president to act extra-legally is legitimate as a robust application of basic 
principles of American constitutional law.    
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ideologies of gender, understood as a community’s articulated forms 
of social self-consciousness, remain ascendant throughout the world.2  
These ideologies are imprinted in the law of all states—modern and ancient, 
religious and secular.3  These ideologies become increasingly less visible as 
societies substitute the language of corruption, psychosis and ethno-national 
chauvinism for that of gender.4  The power of these ideologies to discipline 
and subordinate women is well understood in the West, even among con-
servative jurists.5  Less well-understood is the way in which these ideolo-
gies discipline and subordinate women by defining, disciplining, and sub-
ordinating the “female” in men.6  Thus, intra-sex gendering, these male-
male behavior-privileging norms, serve as the basis for structuring ideal 
behavior norms for all members of society—whether sexed male or female, 
and for the institutions that serve them.7  
This essay considers the subtleties and dynamics of male on male gen-
dering on the construction of law in general, and on the Constitution of the 
American government through its constitutional order in particular, in a 
context in which direct regulation of sexual conduct has lost much of its 
power, but in which the social power of sexual privileging and order re-
mains vitally strong.8  For that purpose, the essay will engage in a close 
reading of a recent work of Harvey Mansfield, a member of the liberal arts 
faculty at Harvard University. In an article recently published in the Ameri-
                                                                                                                           
 
2
 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, 
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005). 
 
3
 See id. at 1. 
 4 See id. at 2.  
 
5
 See id. at 2-3. 
 
6
 For recent efforts to interrogate the subject, see generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN 
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996); E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); MARK E. 
KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA (1991). 
 
7
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 3. Female space, even within some feminist discourse, is shared 
space—mother and child. That seems to be the thrust of some of the most compelling feminist scholar-
ship that has sought to overturn the male centered dynamic of social gendering—to posit a standard that 
is centered on the female.  See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 22-24 (1995) (positing a normative baseline in the 
mother and child in which the male serves as the catch-all for ‘not-mother,’ and suggesting that a father 
is a male who can conform his behavior to the ideal of ‘mother’). 
 
8
 See also Larry Catá Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of 
Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. 
REV. 755 (1993). 
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can Standard, 9 Harvey Mansfield seeks to apply a gendered, male oriented, 
framework of social and political organization that he developed else-
where,10 to reorient foundational understandings of constitutional law prin-
ciples. Professor Mansfield proposes a theory of “lawless” constitutional-
ism, that is of a constitutionally sanctioned power to act beyond the law, as 
the basis for defending a substantial extension of Presidential power under 
the American system of government.11  The essay will unpack the complex 
ideological assumptions underlying a seemingly straightforward analysis 
justifying a non-rule of law simple analysis.  
The thesis of this essay is that Mansfield’s project—to convince the 
reader that traditional rule-of-law constitutionalism emasculates the “true” 
constitutional framework envisioned by the Founders—is grounded on a 
series of ideologies of gender, in which rule-of-law governance is painted 
as female—and appropriate to those branches of government gendered fe-
male (the legislative and judicial branches).  Such governance norms are 
inappropriate to that branch of government gendered male—the executive.  
When rule of law is applied to frame presidential power, however, it re-
makes presidential power defectively male.  A perversion occurs that can be 
corrected only when presidential power is understood in its true light—as 
the embodiment of a state power to act beyond law. The essay starts with a 
discussion of the relation between gender hierarchy and law.  It sets out the 
parameters within which gender analysis of institutional action and facially 
genderless arguments can be understood as embracing gender assumptions 
of three kinds—first a gender hierarchy in which the male is privileged over 
the female, second a set of assumptions about those behaviors that are in-
herently female and those inherently male, and third, a behavior legitimat-
ing reflex avoiding the legitimacy of males or male institutions assuming 
female behavior roles.  This summary provides the basis for the heart of the 
essay in Part III, which analyses Harvey Mansfield’s argument that the con-
stitution vests the president  with a power act extra-legally, and that the 
grant of such power is defensible through an application of conventional 
constitutional principles.    
                                                                                                                           
 
9
 Harvey C. Mansfield, The Law and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna 
Call?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Vol. 11, issue 17 (Jan. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/563mevpm.asp?pg=1 (accessed 
October 23, 2008). 
 
10
 See generally HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MANLINESS (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 
2006). 
 
11
 See Mansfield, supra note 9. 
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II. GENDER PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW 
Ideologies of gender, understood as a community’s articulated forms 
of social self-consciousness, remain ascendant throughout the world.12  
These ideologies are imprinted in the law of all states—modern and ancient, 
religious and secular.13 These ideologies become increasingly less visible as 
societies substitute the language of corruption, psychosis and ethno-national 
chauvinism for that of gender.14 The power of these ideologies to discipline 
and subordinate women is well understood in the West, even among con-
servative jurists.15  Feminists have been at the forefront of thinking through 
issues of gender in law, a subject that remains largely ignored by others, 
even within otherwise critical or progressive movements.16 
Less well-understood is the way in which these ideologies discipline 
and subordinate women by defining, disciplining, and subordinating the 
“female” in men.17 Thus, intra-sex gendering, these male-male behavior-
privileging norms, serve as the basis for structuring ideal behavior norms 
for all members of society—whether sexed male or female, and for the in-
stitutions that serve them.18 
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 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, 
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005). 
 
13
 See id. at 1. 
 14 See id. at 2.  
 
15
 See id. at 2-3. 
 
16
 Joanne Conaghan’s analysis of the work of Duncan Kennedy is illuminating on this score.  
Some early feminist approaches, drawing on Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice, focused on the extent 
to which legal reasoning was based on a masculine “ethic of rights” rather than a feminine “ethic of 
care.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering 
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (applying Gilligan's work). Others looked at the alleg-
edly neutral values and assumptions underpinning legal reasoning and exposed their partiality and 
derivation from male points of view. See, e.g., Regina Graycar, THE GENDER OF JUDGMENTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 262 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995). 
Later, such approaches became tainted with the stain of essentialism, and this may to some extent ex-
plain Kennedy's neglect of them. The idea of law as “gendering,” that is, as constitutive of gender cate-
gories and roles, is the (post)modern, anti-essentialist version of the argument.  Joanne Conaghan, Wish-
ful Thinking Or Bad Faith: A Feminist Encounter With Duncan Kennedy’s Critique Of Adjudication, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 742 & n.108 (2001). 
 
17
 For recent efforts to interrogate the subject, see generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN 
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996); E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); MARK E. 
KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA (1991). 
 
18
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 3. Female space, even within some feminist discourse, is shared 
space—mother and child. That seems to be the thrust of some of the most compelling feminist scholar-
ship that has sought to overturn the male centered dynamic of social gendering—to posit a standard that 
is centered on the female.  See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 22-24 (1995) (positing a normative baseline in the 
mother and child in which the male serves as the catch-all for ‘not-mother,’ and suggesting that a father 
is a male who can conform his behavior to the ideal of ‘mother’). 
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The reinforcement of male hierarchy was traditionally policed through 
the regulation of sexual activity.19 Though sodomy laws, or laws like them, 
have substantially disappeared from the Western world, informal policing 
remains effective, primarily through the mechanisms of everyday social 
rules in which gendered conduct ideals are vested with important social and 
political consequences, sometimes still reinforced with laws of “general” 
applicability.20  But, regulatory mechanisms also have a cultural and social 
dimension.21 This complex web of regulatory networks, bounded in soft and 
hard law, suggests the disciplinary techniques of social organization that 
have been well explored by Michel Foucault.22  Gendered frameworks on 
legitimate behavior, focusing on the male female binary, remain strong be-
cause they have become submerged in the general discourse of power and 
universal behavior norms.  We discuss what is right, just, appropriate, le-
gitimate, but those discussions are grounded in a host of unspoken assump-
tions that revolve around a privileging of the male ideal.  “Not only because 
power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates, but because it is per-
haps just as indispensible to the latter:  would they accept it if they did not 
see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom . . 
. intact?”23      
This gendering is also trans-cultural.24  The foundational nature of in-
tra-male codes of maleness—goodness, right, the privileged social ideal in 
both public and private sphere—finds expression through mechanisms con-
sonant with the normative structure internalized by the particular communi-
ties in which this naturalization occurs.25  In the United States, those 
mechanisms are based on principles of Enlightenment rationalism, with an 
undercurrent of religious foundationalism.26 American popular understand-
ing of the disordered life as backdrop to the political action of the so-called 
American Taliban provides a useful referent.  In Muslim majority states, it 
                                                                                                                           
 
19
 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale About 
the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37 (1993). 
 
20
 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:  CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 8-15, 85 (1999); CARL F. STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL 
IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 34-39 (1998); Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, 
Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 717-18 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Theorizing 
‘Outcrit’ Theories:  Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience —Racecrits, 
Queercrits and Latcrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265, 1296-98 (1999). 
 
21
 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY:  AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley 
trans., Random House 1978) (1976). 
 
22
 See id. 
 
23
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality:  An Introduction (Vol. I) 89 (Robert Hurley, trans., 
New York:  Vintage Books, 1990). 
 
24
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 
25
 For a discussion of Indian patriarchy along these lines, see generally,                                     
RATNA KAPUR, SUBVERSIVE SIGHTS:  FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA (1996). 
 
26
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 22. 
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is mediated through the language of religion and purity.27  This conflation of 
manliness purity, and religiously based intra-male codes of religious and 
political behavior, rationalized through law, was nicely exemplified in the 
sodomy and corruption trials of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia in the late 
1990s,28 and in his subsequent rehabilitation.29 In developing states, gender 
ideologies are sieved through a discourse of post-colonialism and a reinven-
tion of an idealized past.30 Others have developed these notions in India, 
China and Korea with respect to state policy and women’s’ autonomy.31 
The reinforcement of male hierarchy was traditionally policed through 
the regulation of sexual activity.32 Though sodomy laws, or laws like them, 
have substantially disappeared from the Western world, informal policing 
remains effective, primarily through the mechanisms of everyday social 
rules in which gendered conduct ideals are vested with important social and 
political consequences.33 In this guise, critical theory has been instrumental 
in unmasking the continued power of gender, and especially its intersec-
tions with race, ethnicity, and religion in the construction of institutional 
systems of power.34    
Intra-male behavior-privileging social ordering and its political effects 
are also, to some extent, trans-historical.  The notion of effeminacy and 
political behavior, as a dynamic and still living theory of politics, is at least 
as old as Aristotle.35 Conflations of physical, moral and political strength 
are reflected in personal behavior, and give rise to permissions to upset the 
                                                                                                                           
 
27
 See id. 
 
28
 See id.  
 
29
 See Larry Catá Backer, Of Sodomy and Corruption: Sex, Politics, Religion and Law in Malay-
sia, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, Aug. 1, 2006, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/08/of-sodomy-
and-corruption-sex-politics.html. 
 
30
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 2. 
 
31
 See Monica das Gupta et al., State Policies and Women’s Agency in China, the Republic of 
Korea, and India, 1950-2000:  Lessons From Contrasting Experiences, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC 
ACTION 234-259 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton, eds., Stanford CAS:  Stanford University Press, 
2004) (“These case studies illustrate the subtle ways in which states influence the manifestation of 
cultural beliefs and values:  most actions  and policies are not gender neutral; they either increase or 
decrease gender equity.  They also illustrate the constant tension and negotiation between sate ideolo-
gies, state interests, and social norms.” Id., at 258). 
 
32
 See id. at 62; Backer, supra note 8, at 756-57. 
 
33
 See Backer, supra note 8, at 760-61. “The society that emerged in the 19th  century. . . did not 
confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition.  On the contrary, it put into operation an entire 
machinery for producing true discourses concerning it. . . . . Not however, by reason of some natural 
property inherent in sex itself, but my virtue of the tactics of power immanent in this discourse.”  Fou-
cault, History of Sexuality, supra note 22, at 69-70.  And then it moved that discourse underground as a 
set of bedrock assumptions about the way things are that required no further exploration. 
 
34
 See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336-39 (2006); see generally CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997). 
 
35
 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (William Ellis trans., J.M. Dent & 
Sons 1912) (350 B.C.).  
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social order—that is, to act extra-legally.36 “Thus a general at the head of his 
army will endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, de-
spising both his manner of life and his forces; his forces for want of action, 
his life for its effeminacy . . . .”37 The end of tyranny and a certain effemi-
nacy was also conflated:   
Contempt also is often the cause of their destruction: for though, for 
instance, those who raised themselves to the supreme power generally 
preserved it; but those who received it from them have, to speak truth, 
almost immediately all of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate 
way of life, they soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to 
conspiracies.38  
Effeminacy of mind and body could be ascribed to certain activities, 
improperly indulged.  For example, music: 
for it must be admitted that in some cases nothing can prevent music 
being attended, to a certain degree, with the bad effects which are as-
cribed to it; it is therefore clear that the learning of it should never 
prevent the business of riper years, nor render the body effeminate and 
unfit for the business of war or the State; but it should be practised by 
the young, judged of by the old.39  
This is not merely the musings of an ancient citizen of a culture now no 
longer current.  It is reflected in the sexualization of politics.  Thus, it has 
been observed that “Far from being a theoretical abstraction in leftist ideol-
ogy, the conflation of homosexuality and fascism seems to have marked an 
opportunistic capitulation of theory in the face of popular sentiment.”40  The 
opportunism actually masks a naturalization of behavior norm hierarchies 
as a basis for political judgment, one that adds potency to judgments about 
the legitimacy of political actors and the shape and deployment of the state 
government.41  “The identification of proletarian revolution with values of 
virility and sexual potency leads all too easily to an attribution of homo-
sexuality to effeminacy to the enemy:  this observation holds for the com-
munists’ homosexualization of the fascist as much as it does for the fascists’ 
effeminization of the Jew.”42  In each case, homosexualization acts as an 
                                                                                                                           
 
36
 See id.  
 
37
 Id. bk. III, ch. X. 
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 Id. bk. VIII, ch. VI. 
 
40
 Andrew Hewitt, Political Inversions:  Homosexuality, Fascism & the Modernist Imaginary 9 
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University press, 1996). 
 
41
 See Backer, supra note 2, at 53-60. 
 
42
 Hewitt, supra note 39, at 9-10. 
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intensifier of illegitimacy, a magnifier of the corruption and error of the 
action to which the homosexualization—the disorder—is ascribed.    
And this sexualization appears to permeate the foundational interpre-
tive documents produced in defense of the adoption of the American Con-
stitution.43  It is expressed in national political discourse, in the rhetoric of 
Senator Byrd with allusions to Roman Republican civic virtues.44 It is cen-
tral even to the humor of the discourse of state politics as well, with “girlie 
men” as a well understood compression of meaning—the individual who 
behaves outside of acceptable (male) ender norms, whose conduct is per-
sonally corrupt but also corrupts the actions undertaken in that role.45  
Gender norm assumptions, gender behavior ordering and privileging, 
is unconscious, and unconsciously embraced at all levels of society.  It is so 
deeply embedded in cultural understandings that it appears natural.  Like 
anti-Semitism in 19th and early 20th century Germany, gender role expecta-
tions and their naturalization within the legal order are so “fundamental to 
the dominant world view and operation of a society, [that] they are taken for 
granted, often not expressed in a manner commensurate with their promi-
nence and significance or, when uttered, seen as worthy by others to be 
noted and recorded.”46  As feminists have long argued in the context of mar-
riage as both social relationship and regulatory construct,47 regulations serve 
to police identity norms, and patrol the borders of gender expectations.48 
Constitutional law itself is as subject to identity policing as marriage or 
other legal frameworks that replicate and reinforce social understandings of 
communal behaviors.  It is best understood as “more than the mere articula-
tion of a code of behavior or a preference for a particular group or physical 
characteristic. Instead, [it refers] to the active attempt on the part of the 
state to monitor, maintain, and manipulate identity, to patrol its borders in 
much the same way a police officer might guard a jurisdictional boundary 
                                                                                                                           
 
43
 See John Kang, Associate Professor of Law, Saint Thomas University School of Law, Presenta-
tion at the 12th Annual Meeting of LatCrit (Oct. 5, 2007). 
 
44
 See John Tierney, Byrd, at 85, Fills the Forum With Romans and Wrath, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2002, at A1. 
 
45
 See Associated Press, California Gov. Not Sorry For 'Girlie Men' Remark: Democrats Blast 
Schwarzenegger for Mocking Lawmakers, MSNBC NEWS, July 19, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5460326/.  
 
46
 DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND 
THE HOLOCAUST  32 (New York: Vintage Books 1996). 
 
47
 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 1901 (2000). 
 
48
 “Just as important as this setting of social norms, however, is the extent to which state regula-
tions have also served over time to reproduce and police identity norms in the marriage context.” R.A. 
Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight For Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 882 (2008). 
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or keep watch for an intruder.”49  That is precisely what Mansfield means to 
do with a focus on presidential power under the constitution. It is to the way 
in which Mansfield would gender the constitution in the service of legiti-
mating certain Presidential behaviors that the paper turns to next.  
III. A MASCULINE CONSTITUTIONALISM—EXTRA-LEGAL PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER, RULE-OF-LAW LEGISLATURES, AND COURTS  
It comes as no surprise, then, that male elites in the United States, like 
those in other nations, continue to protect the male gender borderlands of 
behavior norms.  And there is no more powerful set of behavior norms than 
law, and especially constitutional law, in the United States. Mansfield’s 
immediate object is to make a specific case for the legitimacy of the Bush 
Administration’s surveillance activities in the war on terror.  In making that 
case, he also suggests a broadly applicable constitutional jurisprudence,50 
which is increasingly heard in some quarters today.  That broad set of con-
stitutional jurisprudence is grounded in the general proposition that the 
American Constitution does not advance merely a rule-of-law system as the 
core of American political governance; instead, the federal Constitution 
represents the whole of sovereign power vested in the federal government.  
That whole power consists of two parts.51  The first is the inward-looking, 
and domesticated system of rule-of-law constitutionalism that characterizes 
the legislative and judicial powers.52  The other is outward looking, and 
mandates the assertion of “extra-legal authority” by the American President 
under certain circumstances, and against certain contingencies.53   
Mansfield’s defense of President Bush’s surveillance projects, and of 
the broader constitutional project, are grounded in a complex system of 
inversions, growing out of a juxtaposition of related binaries set against, 
and building on, each other in a series of parallel analogies.  These binaries 
touch on both the peculiarities of the immediate substantive elements (sur-
veillance, criminality, etc.) and on a parallelism of binary aggregations that 
suggest a fidelity to an ultimate set of grundnorm binaries: sur-
vival/destruction, strong/weak, good/evil, and male/female. 
The initial binary—and binary inversion—presented, is meant to set 
up the arguments that follow.  This initial binary focuses on “law/outlaw.”54  
                                                                                                                           
 
49
 Id.  In this sense, the constitution is very much social design.  See GRETCHEN RITTER, THE 
CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 66 (Stanford CA:  Stanford University Press, 2006). 
 
50
 See Mansfield, supra note 9. 
 
51
 See id. 
 
52
 See id.  For a discussion of constitutionalism in its rule of law framework, see Larry Catá 
Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Analysis of Nationalist and Transna-
tional Constitutionalism, 113:3 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2009). 
 
53
 See Mansfield, supra note 9. 
 
54
 See id. 
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Mansfield poses the greater problem from an initially smaller source—
criminality.55  He suggests a foundational distinction in law between crimi-
nals and enemies.56  That distinction is based on the relationship of both 
criminals, and of enemies, to the political state.57  According to Mansfield, 
Criminals violate the law, and the law can be vindicated with police, 
prosecutors, juries and judges who stay within the law:  at least for the 
most part the law vindicates itself.  Enemies, however, not merely vio-
late but oppose the law.  They oppose our law and want to replace it 
with theirs.58   
Criminals, the reader is told, operate within the law, and its frame-
work, but enemies fall outside the law and that framework.59  Enemies are 
“outlaws”; criminals are merely anti-social people, who must be managed 
in a bureaucratic state.60  Because enemies fall outside the territory marked 
by law, they “need to be faced with extra-legal force.”61 
Of course, this binary, as proposed, ignores a number of things—two 
of which are highlighted here.  First, Mansfield appears to invert the tradi-
tional understanding of outlaw.62 Second, thus inverted, the binary is at 
odds with an emerging American understanding of the relationship of law 
to virtually all human activity.63  
With respect to the first point, in traditional understanding, to engage 
in violations of law by, for example, an activity deemed criminal, was to 
fall outside the law.64  For example, “Icelandic law understood itself as pro-
viding an arena in which a modified form of revenge could take place. . . .  
[An individual] sued and he enforced the judgment unless he assigned his 
action, in which case the responsibility devolved upon the assignee.  The 
law did not issue money judgments in disputes involving injuries or killing.  
The penalty was outlawry, which allowed anyone to kill the outlaw with 
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impunity and obliged the judgment holder to do so.”65  Outlaws could in-
clude any individual, from the poor person who stole a loaf of bread to feed 
a starving family, to a foreign resident the Queen deemed to have engaged 
in political acts of treason.  In contrast, enemies did not fall outside the do-
mestic law, never having been within it, but they fell within the rule sys-
tems guiding conduct among combatants, with both hard and soft content.66  
Mansfield would reverse these ancient understandings to suit his very mod-
ern purpose.   
The second point, which suggests that enemies are conceptually inca-
pable of being treated as criminals, rejects what has, since the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials of defeated political enemies, been a fundamentally 
American project of constructing an international system that does just 
that.67  Post-war American efforts (to the political establishment’s current 
chagrin it seems) have produced an international consensus that tends in-
creasingly to view all anti-social activity as criminal, irrespective of its na-
ture or consequence.68  The criminalization of political and state activity 
within an international context has substantially changed the dynamics of 
the old binary insider/outsider, and internal/external conflict within a new 
regime of “law-fare”—warfare in the courts.69    
The regime of international political criminality, subsumed within the 
regimen of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, thus sug-
gests that there may no longer be much of an area of activity “outside” the 
law.70  It is true enough that Americans have resisted the implications of 
this, as it applies to its international activities.71  The conceptual framework 
that gave it life, however, is as much a core set of American jurisprudential 
values as any recognized within the framework of the federal Constitution. 
Yet the “law/outlaw” binary also serves to reinforce the gendered basis 
of Mansfield’s argument.  Law and criminality are tied to the domestic, to 
the internal matters of state.  Criminals are a matter of family.  Enemies are 
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tied to a public space, to external activities, and to the world of non-
domestic work.  This gendered distinction, which feminist theory has ex-
plored in the construction of national and international legal systems, and in 
the social spaces produced thereby, 72 becomes the crucial first step in Mans-
field’s project to articulate an essentially male space “beyond” law.   
Having asserted the possibility of a dual space for anti-social activ-
ity—within and without the law—Mansfield invokes a complex parallelism 
of related binaries that will build on each other to produce the necessary 
support for his thesis: that the American Constitution provides the President 
with a grant of “extra-legal” power to be used in the President’s discretion 
against enemies of the nation.73  That grant of extra- legal power is founda-
tional to the nature and character of the executive authority granted to the 
Chief Executive, created through Article II of the federal Constitution,74 
without which, it would be impossible to understand the office of the Chief 
Executive as an independent and co-equal branch of the federal govern-
ment.  The federal Constitution, Mansfield tells the reader, created a strong 
executive.75  “A strong executive is one that is not confined to executing the 
laws but has extra-legal powers such as commanding the military, making 
treaties . . . and pardoning the convicted, not to mention a veto of legisla-
tion.”76  This is a thesis far broader than the usual iteration of similar no-
tions in the traditional “unitary executive” theory.77  Rule-of-law unitary 
executives remain firmly grounded in the rule-of-law system of the Consti-
tution, and subject to its constraints.78  Mansfield’s executive is not. 
To get to this understanding of extra-legal Presidential power, 
grounded in the law of the Constitution, Mansfield deploys his second great 
binary—“law/discretion”79—and suggests its inversion as well.80  In flesh-
ing out this binary, a key concept in Mansfield’s argument, Mansfield de-
ploys a series of parallel supporting binaries, each to serve as an analogue 
for, and reflection of the others; all of which are intimately tied to the foun-
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dational governing binaries of the American state, which lurk in the back-
ground until the very end—survival/destruction, strong/weak, 
male/female.81  Mansfield seeks to describe a well-ordered governmental 
house, in which the functional differentiation inherent in separation of pow-
ers is both necessary and natural given the characteristics of each of the 
elements of government—a domestic and rule-bound legislature, and judi-
ciary—in contradistinction to the assertive and unbound protective power 
of the executive.82  Constitutionalism merely institutionalizes and assimi-
lates these natural distinctions.83 
Presidential extra-legal activities, like surveillance, are not illegal 
merely because they fall outside the law, Mansfield argues.84  Assertions of 
extra-legal power are lawful because the American rule-of-law system, 
founded on the federal Constitution, permits lawless activity under the cir-
cumstances therein specified.85  Thus, according to Mansfield, “it is wrong 
to accuse President Bush of acting illegally in the surveillance of possible 
enemies, as if that were a crime and legality is all that matters.”86  Notice 
here the conflation of binaries “criminal/enemy” and “law/extra-legal.”87  
The argument points to the need to protect the order of household admini-
stration, and the fear that a disordered house, where the rules of functionally 
differentiated power are not observed, will serve to pull down the house 
altogether.88 
It is at this point that Mansfield makes his alternative, and critical, ar-
gument.  He suggests that constitutional rule-of-law must be understood as 
constitutionally limited, that is, of occupying only part of the governance 
space described by the Constitution in the government it creates.89  This 
leads to an interrogation—and ultimate limitation—of the scope of a prop-
erly understood constitutional rule-of-law system.  Mansfield suggests that 
there is no identity between constitutional rule-of-law and constitutional-
ism, at least in the American context.90 “The Constitution took seriously a 
difficulty in the rule of law that the republican tradition before 1787 had 
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slighted.”91  Rule-of-law, understood as a form of “standing rules,” is an 
appropriate subject for ordinary legislative functioning—power in the hands 
of many, rule supremacy over discretionary power, etc.  It is focused on the 
domestic sphere.  In a domestically focused context, legislative power can 
be favored over the executive, and law over discretion.  
Rule-of-law constitutionalism is female space.  For Mansfield, this 
space can only partially describe the extent of actual governmental (or 
state) power that could be lawfully asserted under our constitutional grant 
of sovereign power to the institutions of the federal government.  He tells 
the reader: “[y]et the rule of law is not enough to run a government,” and it 
was government that the Constitution created.92  Rule-of-law, and even con-
stitutional rule-of-law constitutionalism, must then itself be limited within 
an overall theory of governance. Mansfield appears to suggest that implicit 
in the Constitution is the idea that an appropriately constituted government 
needs “both the rule of law and the power to escape it—and that twofold 
need is just what the Constitution provides for.”93  The Constitution thus 
provides a framework in which two conceptions of legitimate state author-
ity co-exist.  The first is the ordinary rule-of-law governance, understood as 
a state constituted from democratic principles and grounded in legislative 
superiority 94  But while this is a necessary framework for establishing a  
legitimate state, it is also an insufficient basis for constituting a state that 
lasts, because of the “inflexibility of the rule of law.”95 Fidelity to the con-
stitution requires its interpretation as a system that is both efficient in gen-
eral and which does not hobble the state in its operation, if in so hobbling, 
the Republic is rendered inoperable.96  
As such, the constitution must include provision for the assertion of all 
authority necessary to ensure its preservation, and that authority out to be 
consonant with the nature of the power given to each branch of govern-
ment.  Rule of law is appropriate to collegial bodies where power is by 
definition diffused among many co-equal individuals.  That is the essence 
of the legislature and judicial power.    Yet, state authority is incomplete 
without a way around rule of law to be asserted by the executive as neces-
sary to save the state from internal and external threats against which rule 
of law governance provides no defense.  This principle of extra-legal con-
stitutionally legitimate authority, of course, has its own limitations and 
risks.  And Mansfield does not avoid naming them.  That danger is the well 
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documented (even in a strongly Republican system) the risk of Caesarism 
in our executive.97 The echoes of Aristotle’s “family/state” political theory 
are strong.98  Rule-of-law corresponds to law and criminality; discretion 
corresponds to extra-legal power and enemies of the state. Ironically, of 
course, that risk is probably greater when the executive is a likeable chap 
(perhaps a future president) than, in the case of the second President Bush 
(for whose immediate benefit Mansfield articulated his interpretive theory), 
whose popularity among the masses, media and elites is quite low. 
How does the Constitution provide space for both a limited rule-of-law 
system and democratic Caesarism?  Mansfield suggests that the doctrines of 
separation of powers, and checks and balances, starkly highlight this consti-
tutional binary between (rule of) law and discretion.99  Law is built into the 
legislative and judicial branches—but not into the core of the executive 
function.100  The legislature and the judiciary are bound by rule-of-law con-
stitutionalism; law is the thing they produce and manage and to which they 
are subject.101  This, Mansfield describes as the choice aspects of constitu-
tionalism.102  But the higher law of the Constitution constitutes the lawful 
power of the President differently.103  The “executive power represents ne-
cessity in the form of responses to emergencies.”104  He elaborates: 
The Constitution mixes choice and necessity, reflecting our desire for 
self-government (which takes effect in our legislature) and our recog-
nition of the limitations of human foresight and the imperfection of 
human laws.  These are opposite principles made into opposing ele-
ments of our government.105   
Together, they form the entirety of the constitution of lawful power 
that may be asserted by the State.  Thus, Mansfield uses a traditional sepa-
ration of powers analysis as the basis for the support of a non-rule-of-law 
legal system.  Separation of powers serves as a proxy for the split between 
the rule-of-law governance (by legislation and the judiciary) and extra-legal 
executive power.  In this, it serves as an idealized and institutional version 
of the separation of functions in a marriage.  And with this separation is 
understood to come a necessary hierarchy, reflecting the division of author-
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ity between a man and his wife.106  The West has understood these gendered 
divisions of institutional functions for a long time before the founding of 
the Republic.  These functional differentiations, and the hierarchies they 
give rise to, as well as the fundamentally gendered nature of the division, 
has long served as, for example, a foundation of the organization of power 
within the Catholic Church, and the Church’s relationship to the Trinity.107  
But they are also complementary principles.  By fiercely asserting the 
bases of each of their powers, the three branches serve to check the others, 
producing a democratic whole.108  “The Constitution maintains both oppo-
site principles by arranging for an interested party or parties to support [its 
organizing principle] in exercising its power.”109  Checks and balances thus 
serve as a proxy for the only constitutionally permitted basis for controlling 
the ascendancy of either a hidebound rule-of-law state on the one hand, or 
Caesarism on the other.110 Consequently, the structural or principled limita-
tions of rule of law governance as a structural basis for limiting the asser-
tions of power by any branch of government must give way to political 
exigency—and thus subject only to the power of the other branches to resist 
by resort to those mechanisms constitutionally granted them, or to that of 
the electorate.  Thus, according to Mansfield, “there will be conflict be-
tween discretion and the rule-of-law, each party aware of the other principle 
but more convinced by its own.”111   
And thus, the Constitutional framework is reduced to a great binary in 
motion: the American government is thus a combustion engine that operates 
as the force of a constant series of explosions among the branches, moving 
the pistons of state from monarchism to republicanism, while avoiding the 
extremes of tyranny and demagogic democracy.112  Still, this argument 
would have to confront over a century of jurisprudence suggesting signifi-
cant limits on Presidential “extra-legal” power,113 as well as modern rule-of-
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law based arguments for curtailing (or taming) the extra-legal power of the 
President.114  Though he devotes no time to it, it might be reasonable to as-
sume that Mansfield would dismiss over a century of rule-of-law jurispru-
dence that clearly views the President in a far less extra-legal power capac-
ity as partisan—that is, as efforts by one branch to control another—and on 
that basis to constitute a less authoritative interpretive source. 
The law/discretion binary thus serves as a cover for a number of paral-
lel binaries—active/passive, individual/group, monarchy/republic, separa-
tion of powers/checks and balances.  But Mansfield is not done with separa-
tion of powers.  He elaborates by drawing support from the Federalist Pa-
pers, which he refers to as “the most authoritative source for understanding 
the thinking of the Framers.”115   He also seems to draw on his interpretation 
of the cultural context of gender-social assumptions that were current at the 
time of the Founding as the basis for reading those authoritative works as 
political documents.116 Mansfield reads the Federalist Papers to strengthen 
the idea that the Framers had meant to constitute a republican monarchy.117 
Responsibility is vested in the executive.118  “To be sure of responsibility 
you must fix it on one person; true responsibility is sole responsibility.  That 
is why, under our republican Constitution, the people, when they want to 
hold the whole government responsible, end up holding the president re-
sponsible.”119  The logic of this progression is not beyond dispute, and in-
deed its simplicity and naiveté seem to serve as the greatest arguments 
against it.  Whatever the value of Mansfield’s insight, he uses it to buttress 
the law/discretion binary, and its formal incorporation into the American 
constitutional order.120 
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Yet he also uses selective references to the Federalist Papers for an-
other purpose:  to privilege the constitutional principle of efficient govern-
ment (corresponding to European constitutional notions of effet utile)121 
over the anti-tyranny principle built into rule-of-law governance.122  Mans-
field conflates the idea that the Framers sought to make a strong executive 
“in order to have both power and security,”123 with a fundamental reconsid-
eration of the meaning of separation of powers.  That reconsideration leads 
to a reconstitution of the unitary part of the unitary executive.  Separation of 
powers is characterized as a 17th century invention improved by the Fram-
ers.
124
  That improvement consisted of a strengthening of the executive.125  
“They enabled the executive to act independently of the legislature [some-
thing Mansfield now suggests would be impossible in a monopolistic rule-
of-law constitutional order] and not merely to serve as its agent in executing 
the laws.”126   
What does Mansfield mean? Perhaps he is suggesting that the execu-
tive, in order to be denominated as such, must exist not merely as a servant 
of the legislature and the courts, but must be able to assert power in his own 
right.  But the only sort of power that the executive may assert in his own 
right must be extra-legal—that is extra-legislative—power.  Otherwise, he 
remains merely the subordinate and minister of the legislature and the 
courts.  If the Constitution means what it says—and it says that it created 
three co-equal branches of government that together constitute the state127—
then the executive must be able to assert an authority equal to, and inde-
pendent of, that of the other branches.  Mansfield seems to suggest that this 
extra-legal power may only be asserted in emergencies,128 but asserted it 
must if the executive is to be co-equal.  Thus, separation of powers suggests 
that to assert lawful power, the President must be able (in an emergency) to 
disregard the law.  His actions may be illegal (that is, contrary to the power 
of Congress to legislate and the courts to hear cases), but not unconstitu-
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tional (that is, exceeding the lawful powers of his office as set forth in the 
Constitution itself).  “Emergency action of this kind may be illegal but not 
unconstitutional; or since the Constitution is a law, it is not illegal under the 
Constitution.”129 
The law/discretion binary is thus critical to the development of Mans-
field’s constitutional theory of a constitutionalism in which rule-of-law as-
pects of the Constitution are separable from a legal power to avoid law.  
But, the law/discretion binary subsumes a number of other binaries running 
in parallel.  And it is those supporting binaries, to binaries that seem drawn 
from “natural,” 130 that Mansfield invokes.  And it is in this effort that Mans-
field’s reliance on strict gendering, and the conflation of power, law, and 
social organization in gendered terms is most easily visible.  Mansfield 
speaks of the binary law/discretion in terms of responsibility versus irre-
sponsibility, of efficiency of individual action versus inefficiency of con-
sensus or institutional action, of the rule-of-law versus necessity in extre-
mis.131  But, again grounding analysis on his extractions from the Federalist 
Papers, he focuses on another set of binaries that he suggests run in parallel, 
or serve to illustrate the law/discretion binary: energy versus stability, 
“terms taken from physics to designate discretion and law.  Energy has its 
place in the executive, and the foremost guarantee of energy is unity . . . .   
Unity facilitates ‘decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’”132  The Presi-
dent must be understood as a constitutionally mandatory nexus-point for 
energy, discretion, unity, singularity and responsibility.133   
Thus, the president appears as the embodiment of the male principle.134  
The legislature and judiciary are not.  These institutions represent the fe-
male principle.135  Stability, nurture, standing rules, consensus and limitation 
of power serve as the constitutionally mandatory expression of the con-
struction of an institutional and limited assertion of its form and content.  
Mansfield thus constructs a constitutional theory based on those binaries at 
the heart of gendered social ordering.  Male/female, strong/weak, pub-
lic/private, these are the parallels used to justify a division in which men 
dominate the state and women are relegated to civil society.136   
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And here, Mansfield is able to begin to bring the analysis around to its 
conclusion—that secrecy is the sort of action that is most consonant with 
energy, and the responsibility, properly understood, of the executive.137  
Thus, Mansfield argues, “secrecy is compatible with responsibility because, 
when one person is responsible, it does not matter how he arrives at his 
decision.”138 By implication, secrecy might be incompatible with law (and 
the rule-of-law)—with stability—a telling point—but not for Mansfield.  
Instead, that parallelism suggests the need for lawlessness in the executive 
rather than an absence of secrecy within government, considered as a 
whole.139  Secrecy is incompatible with law, but perfectly compatible with 
responsibility bound up in the body of a single executive.140  This practice, 
Mansfield suggests, is truer to American cultural practice than a more col-
legial and institutionalized decision-making process subsumed under the 
legislation rule-of-law model.141  Thus, the attempt to bring secrecy under 
the law is the same, for Mansfield, as bringing the President under Congress 
and the Courts as a mere minister of enforcement of law.  It is in this con-
text that Mansfield would prefer surveillance and torture to be understood 
in the American constitutional context: the rule-of-law cannot apply when 
law does not apply—in those emergencies in which a President must assert 
a lawless, masculine, virile, protective, singular power.142 “You have to do 
what you have to do” reminds Mansfield, quoting John McCain, on the 
issue of torture.143 Surveillance reasserts a private/public distinction at the 
heart of gendered ordering of law and politics.144   
There is thus a space within American constitutionalism, Mansfield 
argues, “when liberties are dangerous and law does not apply.”145 Lawless-
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ness of this sort is both moral and lawful, precisely because it rejects the 
weakness and stability of rule-of-law constitutionalism.146 The higher law of 
the Constitution is said to solve this problem by making lawless actions 
lawful.147  The male principle is thus embedded in the uniqueness of the 
Presidential office.  And, in this way, Mansfield would undo two hundred 
years of American jurisprudence built in the blood of the colonists’ English 
forbearers, who took down a Stuart king of England and Scotland to defend 
the primacy of law—organic, extra governmental—and binding on a mon-
arch who would also assert the virile power of lawless activity.148  This 
binding power once severed the neck of a King to the power of law.149  
Mansfield forgets that the American republic was built on that scaffold.   
For Mansfield, then, a federal Constitution that is bound solely by 
rule-of-law constitutionalism, a constitution in which legislative and inter-
pretive power appear to set the boundaries of executive action, is a constitu-
tion that is defective, and defectively male.150  Rule-of-law constitutional-
ism is essentially defectively male, effeminate, and thus female.151  This is 
to be despised, as Mary Anne Case reminds us, for two reasons:  “The man 
who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly despised, for manifesting the dis-
favored qualities and for descending from his masculine gender privilege to 
do so.”152  The male principle153—energy, discretion, responsibility, singu-
larity, and unity154—must serve to provide a space in which lawlessness is 
lawful.   Mansfield thus builds on binaries, with significant gendered tones, 
to present a picture of an appropriately manly construction of the constitu-
tion.  Still, consider the consequence for such a construction of American 
law:  rule-of-law constitutionalism is female, and incomplete, without the 
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male principle of governance—a certain lawlessness in the executive. That 
lawlessness is to be used against the enemies of the state, against which 
rule-of-law limitations do not apply.155 In this constitutional order—
surveillance, torture, military tribunals, military action without Congres-
sional approval—all would follow the power of the President as Com-
mander in Chief.156  Extension of the rule-of-law to the executive reduces 
the President to something less than complete—in gendered terms, a defec-
tive male—and that would produce a parallel defect in the American consti-
tutional legal order.157  Because the Founders could not have intended the 
creation of an effeminate legal order, the President must be accorded extra-
legal constitutional power.158  Mansfield would label this “monarchical re-
publicanism.”159 
For all of that, Mansfield has not created a constitutional theory out of 
whole cloth.  Instead, whether he knows it or not, he has drawn on a rich 
source of ancient constitutional theory that long predates the founding of 
the Republic.  This constitutional theory, going back to Bracton in England, 
suggests a division between the lawmaking and executive function—that is, 
between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.160   
Within the sphere of gubernaculum, the power of those who hold au-
thority to act is absolute.  That power could be expressed by action—
the enforcement action of the state—and also by enactment of law, 
narrowly conceived.  The narrowness of the conception is grounded in 
the fundamental distinction between enactments of an administrative 
character, and the power to define a legal right.161   
The lawmaking function is essentially organic, customary, conservative, 
and communal, and not lightly disturbed.  “I think it extremely dangerous to 
make any change in the law touching the constitution.  .  .  .  But to touch 
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the laws of the constitution is as dangerous as to undermine the founda-
tions, or remove the cornerstone on which the whole weight of the building 
rests.”162 Lawmaking is thus to be distinguished from the executive function 
of the executive—traditionally the monarch—whose principal obligation 
was to maintain the integrity of the state.163  This division was the basis of 
Stuart absolutism164— an absolutism that appears to have survived the be-
heading of Charles I in 1649 and now reappears in its more pristine tradi-
tional form, in the guise of Mansfield’s muscular, extra-legal, power-
wielding executive.165  This is not merely traditionalism, or even original 
understanding; this might well be a reactionary stance, even by the stan-
dards of the Founding generation.166 
Yet, Mansfield’s underlying gendered analysis causes an inversion of 
original doctrine and a perversion of traditional male ordering.  Still, the 
ordering survives his analysis.  That is because gendered action is still at the 
core of the value system at the foundation of the Republic.167  Mansfield’s 
essay168 suggested the ironies inherent in his articulation of manliness,169 
through Presidential extra-legal muscularity.  A great irony centers on Ham-
ilton’s poorly remembered justification for union as a means to protect 
rights and the rule-of-law, set out in Federalist No. 8.170  Hamilton suggested 
that the United States, like Great Britain, can profit from union, because of 
its geographic position as a state insulated from constant warfare and the 
need to defend its territory.171  In such a context, the rights of the people 
(and their resolve to protect these rights) would be strengthened, and their 
otherwise justifiable fear of a military state would be diminished.172   
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a 
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in 
one which is often subject to them and always apprehensive of them . . 
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. the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be al-
ways prepared to repel it, her armies must be numerous enough for in-
stant defence.  The continual necessity for his services enhances the 
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition 
of the citizen.  The military state becomes elevated above the civil.  
The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably 
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to 
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are 
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as 
their superiors.  The transition from this disposition to that of consid-
ering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it is very dif-
ficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold 
or effectual resistance, to usurpations supported by the military 
power.173  
Mansfield will take this insight and turn it on its head, suggesting a no-
tion of rule-of-law as both effeminate and passive that was once, more ap-
propriately, the province of more totalitarian ideologies.174  But, even the 
focus on surveillance suggests inversion: the object of strong executive 
extra-legal power is surveillance in the protection of the state.175  But sur-
veillance itself was traditionally gendered female—the sort of thing gen-
tlemen will not do.176  But, surveillance appears to become male in the face 
of a greater failure of maleness—the resort to terror in lieu of traditional 
acts of war between equals.  Terror is depicted as cowardly, sneaky, con-
spiratorial, dishonorable, uncontrolled and reactive—all of the attributes of 
the traditionally depicted defective male.177  It follows that terror would 
itself likely be gendered female, causing a “cure” or at least a rehabilitation 
of surveillance.   
Mansfield thus suggests that as the Presidential Power is gendered 
male, the President’s Constitutional powers extend beyond the mere execu-
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tion of the laws.178  “Thus it is wrong to accuse President Bush of acting 
illegally in the surveillance of possible enemies, as if that were a crime and 
legality is all that matters.”179  If law is male, Mansfield suggests, then rule-
of-law is defectively male (and thus subordinate as female)—passive, doc-
ile and risk averse.180  He effectively suggests an Aristotelian political ef-
feminacy181—and not as a source of strength.  And by imposing and enforc-
ing these differences, differences based on a need to distinguish male from 
female behavior—to distinguish more from less valued behavior—
Mansfield’s exercise in “manliness” is symptomatic of the more subtle, and 
corroding, subversive nature of the hierarchy of male gendering.  Intra-
sexual gender role hierarchies, based on a normative model of male role 
supremacy, continue to marginalize the normatively female, both within 
each sex and between the sexes.  When this marginalization becomes the 
stuff of constitutional analysis, caudillismo cannot be too far behind. 
IV. THERE IS NO LOSING FOR WINNING 
This essay has suggested the ways in which Mansfield's efforts to re-
produce an originalist and gendered constitutionalism produce, instead, an 
aggregation of inversions.  These inversions draw on a number of original 
sources of American constitutionalism, but more importantly, on the gen-
dered hierarchy of values and its expression as political doctrine.  This es-
say engaged these efforts through a close reading of Mansfield’s develop-
ment of a constitutionally sanctioned proposal of a President with legitimate 
extra-legal authority.  It suggested that Mansfield’s reading of law and 
presidential power is couched not only in gendered terms but in irony as 
well—the disciplining of manliness through inversion is an odd thing in-
deed.  There is both audacity and inversion in the understanding of the 
American Constitutional system Mansfield proposes.  His reading is more 
consonant with Francis Bacon’s understanding of Stewart absolutism within 
a customary law society,182 than it is with popular constitutional understand-
ing in the United States in the 21st century.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that it does reflect an underlying valid, though currently unpopular, reading 
of the possibilities of American constitutionalism—if it is instead an early 
assertion of a coming reality—then it suggests a move to a conception of 
constitutional governance largely abandoned here for a long time.  Perhaps 
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Mansfield is right, the United States is moving towards a neo-medievalism 
in its political organization—which, it had been thought, the Founding gen-
eration sought to avoid.183  A gendered analysis of this framework analysis 
helps expose both its character and consequences. 
And yet, even if Mansfield’s extra-legal constitutionalism is misplaced 
in historical context—and two hundred years of male dominated American 
jurisprudence suggests that it is184—the gendered legal order still survives 
intact.  Theory merely reverts to the traditional binary which genders rule-
of-law as male, and the domestic portion of the private sphere female, and 
thus extra-legal.  Law is supposed to be rational, objective, abstract, and 
principled, like men; it is not supposed to be irrational, subjective or per-
sonalized, like women.185  And, thus, is exposed the ultimate inversion of 
Mansfield’s formulation of extra-legal constitutionalism—the idea of un-
regulated space; extra-legal space is traditionally gendered male, when in 
fact it forms, as feminist theory has long understood, the core of “unregu-
lated space” gendered female (and consciously unregulated because it does 
not merit the attention of positivist state theory186 or post-Dicey constitu-
tionalist theory).187   
Either way, the unitary executive theory, now in its current form al-
most a century old,188 has assumed a more medieval caste in the hands of 
Harvey Mansfield.  I have suggested that, like Francis Bacon before him, 
extolling the extra constitutional power of the Stuart Monarchs,189 Harvey 
Mansfield serves well an executive seeking to distinguish the executive 
office, in form and in kind, from the more consensus based, domestic and 
inward looking branches of government.  The implications, from the per-
spective of hierarchy and subordination, extend well beyond institutional 
theory.190  Mansfield represents an urge to neo-medievalism that is becom-
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ing increasingly fashionable among those elements of the American elite 
who are no longer happy with the dominant Enlightenment foundationalism 
of the Republic.    
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